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ABSTRACT
This research examines the diverse historical narratives of the 1918 Najaf Revolt against British
forces during the concluding months of World War I on the Mesopotamian front. For a century,
two distinguishable narratives have been developed and promoted in Iraqi literature: Pan-Arabist
and religious, reflecting the objectives, motivations, and present-mindedness of two political eras
in modern Iraqi history. Several local primary sources, mostly memoirs of Najafis who witnessed
or participated in the revolt, have been re-surfaced and re-visited during the past twenty years.
These primary sources shed new light on the established Pan-Arabist narrative or the recent
religious framing of the revolt. The thesis aims to examine these primary sources to reveal how
they corroborate or contradict with these two dominant interpretations of the revolt. This
comparison showcases a complicated political and social reality on the ground in Najaf on the
eve of a post-Ottoman Iraq, where simple and straightforward labels of Pan-Arabist or religious
narratives do not entirely convey the complex social and political landscape, competing loyalties,
and personal interests and objectives among the population of Mesopotamia's holiest city.

KEYWORDS: British occupation of Mesopotamia, Iraq, local revolts against British forces,
Mesopotamian Campaign, military campaigns, Najaf, World War I

iii

THE 1918 ANTI-BRITISH REVOLT IN NAJAF:
LOCAL PRIMARY SOURCES VS
NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS
NARRATIVES

By
Mohammed Harba

A Master’s Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate College
Of Missouri State University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts, History

August 2020

Approved:

Djene R. Bajalan, D.Phil., Thesis Committee Chair
John F. Chuchiak, Ph.D., Committee Member
Eric W. Nelson, D.Phil., Committee Member
Julie Masterson, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate College

In the interest of academic freedom and the principle of free speech, approval of this thesis
indicates the format is acceptable and meets the academic criteria for the discipline as
determined by the faculty that constitute the thesis committee. The content and views expressed
in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and are not endorsed by Missouri State University,
its Graduate College, or its employees.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Djene Bajalan for his guidance,
feedback, and engagement during the course of my graduate research. I also would like to thank
Dr. Eric Nelson for his valuable support throughout my academic journey at Missouri State
University and Dr. John Chuchiak for expanding my knowledge in exploring and researching
primary sources.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction

1

Chapter One: Official British Records

6

Chapter Two: Historiography
British Post-War Narrative
Returning to Mesopotamia: The Search for Lessons from the Past
Pre-2003 Iraqi Historiography: In Search for a Nationalist Narrative
Post-2003 Iraqi Historiography: The Religious Factor

14
15
20
24
29

Chapter Three: Local Primary Sources vs Pan-Arabist Narrative

33

Chapter Four: Local Primary Sources vs Religious Narrative

44

Conclusion

51

Bibliography

54

vi

INTRODUCTION

The 1918 Najaf Revolt against British forces during the First World War was recorded in
several official British documents and in the local publications that were distributed by British
authorities in Mesopotamia. These official documents, combined with eyewitness accounts from
both sides of the conflict, have shaped the historical narrative of this event for a hundred years
and provided historians with primary sources that shed light on varying social and political
aspects of the reality on the ground in Mesopotamia, the Middle Euphrates in particular, during
the war’s final months.
The historical significance of this short-lived armed conflict that broke out during the
final stages of the First World War is directly associated with the religious influence of its
location; the Holy City of Najaf, where the seat of the world’s Shia religious authority resides.
Najaf houses the grand Shia seminary known as al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah, where Shia clerics and
scholars are educated. This seminary, constituted by several senior Grand Ayatollahs, exerts
religious authority over the majority of the Shia communities around the world. The holy city
also houses the Golden Shrine of Ali, Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin and the
Shias’ paramount Imam. In 1908, the population of the city was roughly 35,000, and it consisted
of the religious scholars, seminary students and clerics, and the local Iraqis, including the militias
of al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt. These warring local militias, comprised of young men from the
four quarters of the city; al-'Amārah, al-Burāq, al-Ḥuwīsh and al-Mishrāq, became prominent for
their continuous role in protecting the city from the raiding tribes of the Arabian desert. The
weak Ottoman authorities and their inability to defend the areas adjacent to the desert made it
possible for these local militias to expand and flourish. The four high-ranking leaders who
1

controlled the quarters of Najaf also controlled al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt militias, allowing them
to exert immense power over the city’s political and social life. In addition to the local
population, Najaf was also home to thousands of people from the Shia world who desired to
reside near the Golden Shrine of Ali.1
The city was extremely unique, not only because of its religious status, but also because
of the fact that it liberated itself from Ottoman control in May 1915. Several towns in the Middle
Euphrates Valley rebelled against Ottoman authorities during the early stages of the First World
War, and these rebellions were mostly crushed in a brutal fashion, Yet, the local militias of
Najaf, with the support of the city’s influential religious leaderships, managed to develop an
autonomous governing system that remained in power until the British conquest of Baghdad in
March 1917.2
Following their decisive victory in Mesopotamia’s largest city, British authorities
attempted to alter the political landscape in the Middle Euphrates and other parts of
Mesopotamia that had been stripped away from the Ottomans during the war. However, the
challenge for the British was that many local residents rejected these political changes. In the
case of Najaf, this sudden change in the political landscape and the inadequate British experience
in dealing with the local population, who also had their own agendas and priorities, culminated
an anti-British armed revolt in Mesopotamia’s holiest city.
According to most of the scholarly literature, both British and Iraqi, the first shots of the
revolt were heard on the morning hours of 19 March 1918 when a group of well-organized
armed men who formed a political society in Najaf a few months prior, stormed the British
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administration’s al-Ḥaffīz; the local mispronunciation of the English word ‘office’, located
outside the city walls. The attackers killed the British Political Officer of Najaf; Captain William
Macandrew Marshall, and wounded another officer who rushed to the aide of his colleague.
Another escalation took place that same day when two British-appointed local policemen were
shot and killed. Following these incidents, British authorities acted swiftly, blockading the city
and demanding the surrender of the perpetrators, in addition to paying a fine of 50,000 rupees
and 1,000 rifles. When the rebels rejected these terms, British forces occupied the strategic
southwestern quarter of al-Ḥuwīsh. Captain Francis Cecil Campbell Balfour; the Political Officer
of al-Shāmīyah Division, which included the city of Najaf, worked with the pro-British
population of Najaf to locate and arrest the rebels and to collect the fine that was imposed on the
city by British authorities. These joint efforts ultimately led to the conclusion of the blockade
that lasted forty-six days. The trial of the arrested rebels was held on 5 May 1918 and was
concluded twenty days later. The court martial sentenced sixteen rebels to exile to India, nine
rebels to different periods of imprisonment, and eleven to death. These death sentences were
carried out on 30 May 1918, ending the troubles in Najaf during that critical phase of the First
World War on the Mesopotamian front.3
This research explores newly-popularized Iraqi primary sources, mostly memoirs written
by religious scholars, students, residents and politicians from Najaf, and how these eyewitness
accounts of the revolt challenge major aspects of both Pan-Arab nationalist and religious
narratives that have dominated the revolt’s historical characterization in the collective memory of
Iraq. Several of these primary sources were published in post-2003 Iraq, following the collapse
of the Pan-Arab nationalist government. As for the documents and memories that were
3
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previously published during the second half of the 20th century, they did not receive a sizeable
academic attention or re-prints due to their controversial nature and the way they challenged the
already established historical narrative of the revolt that mostly promoted Pan-Arab nationalist
themes. These primary sources were also re-published in post-2003 Iraq.
Chapter One delves into British official records that documented the 1918 Najaf Revolt
while it was unfolding. Although, these documents clearly focus on the British viewpoint, they
uniquely provide a real-time narrative of the revolt and the evolving situation on the ground.
Chapter Two, on the other hand, examines how British and Iraqi literature has revisited and
interpreted the revolt during the past one-hundred years. These two chapters focus on the revolt’s
already established historical narratives and interpretations.
Chapters Three and Four employ Iraqi primary sources to question the two most
established historical narratives of the revolt: Pan-Arabist and religious interpretations. These
primary sources reflect various local viewpoints of individuals who experienced the revolt
firsthand or even participated in it. Sayyīd Muḥammad Ḥassan al-Qūjanī, Sayyīd Muḥammad
'Alī Ḥibat al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Shahristanī, Sayyīd Muḥammad Amīn Al-Khū’ī, Sayyīd
Muḥammad Mahdī Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, and al-Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kāshif al-Ghiṭa' were all
associated with Najaf’s religious seminary al-Ḥawzah al-’Ilmīyah. Their recollections of the
revolt reflect the diverse viewpoints religious scholars had towards the conflict. The memoirs of
Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shabībī, an Iraqi politician who hailed from a renowned Najafi family and
was among the activists who later pushed for Iraqi independence, reflect the views of the
educated class in the city. On the other hand, the recollections of Sayyīd Muḥsin Abū Ṭabīkh and
Tūmān ‘Adwah, who were active in combating British presence in Mesopotamia, reflect the
experiences of those who opposed the rapid political and social changes that stormed the country
4

during the First World War. The memoirs of Sayyīd Muḥammad Ḥassan al-Qūjanī and Sayyīd
Muḥammad Amīn Al-Khū’ī and Sayyīd Muḥammad Amīn Al-Khū’ī were written in Persian,
while the rest were written in Arabic. These different primary sources provide a detailed
historical narrative of the events that took place in Najaf during the spring of 1918. Although the
eyewitness testimonies contain several discrepancies and inconsistencies, especially with dates,
numbers and minor details, they generally tend to be personal reflections of the authors’ own
views, experiences, and reactions to these events.
Chapter Three examines how Iraqi primary sources, mostly memoirs published or reprinted for the first time during the past twenty years, challenge or validate the Pan-Arabist
narrative that had surfaced during the 1970s and remained dominant for more than three decades.
The Pan-Arab nationalist characterization of al-Hāj Najm al-Baqāl al-Duylaymī, a key leader of
the revolt, as an Arab national idol who fought for liberty and independence is examined and
compared against the recorded eyewitness experiences of local Najafis. Chapter Four examines
how local primary sources address the role of the Najafi religious establishment in shaping the
outcome of the revolt, with a focus on the various narratives surrounding the role of Grand
Ayatollah Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Ṭabātabā’ī al-Yazdī, the paramount religious scholar of alḤawzah al-’Ilmīyah. The actions of the religious establishment and its paramount leader are
integral to the revolt’s religious-centric narrative, which has become prevalent in post-2003 Iraq.

5

CHAPTER ONE: OFFICIAL BRITISH RECORDS

The primary sources that documented the 1918 Najaf Revolt are mostly memoirs of local
Iraqi eyewitnesses or of British officials who were directly involved in administering
Mesopotamia during the First World War. The majority of these memoirs were penned years or
even decades after the war. As for recorded eyewitness testimonies, the majority of them were
the product of the 1960s and 1970s; more than fifty years following the conclusion of the First
World War. The only exception is British official cables and records. Even the sole Arabiclanguage primary source that documented the revolt while it was unfolding is also an official
British publication. These British documents differ from the other available primary sources
because they are not heavily influenced by personal narratives or reflect recalled memories.
Although they provide a real-time documentation of the revolt, they tend to focus on British
military and political objectives in Mesopotamia during the war, covering a single aspect of this
intricate short-lived military conflict.
British official documents and correspondence point to the tribal Arab inhabitants of
Najaf as the primary instigator that triggered the revolt. These documents are quick to highlight
the three different population groups that inhabited Najaf during that time-period, blaming the
ensuing unrest that swept through the holy city in March 1918 on a single group, while
exonerating the remaining two. These three major groups are: the Arab inhabitants from the
competing al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt, the Persian Najafis, and the religious students and
scholars.4

4
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British official literature highlights the role of the Najaf townsmen from al-Zuqurt and alShumurt militias in driving the 1915 Najaf rebellion against the Ottomans, which allowed the
holy city to enjoy complete autonomy for more than two years during the First World War. This
control over a large urban area bustling with pilgrims and influential religious scholars mostly
benefited the four tribal sheiks representing the two competing factions of al-Zuqurt and alShumurt: Sayyīd Mahdī Ibn Sayyīd Salmān who was the chief sheik of al-Zuqurt, al-Ḥāj ‘Aṭīyah
Abū Qallal, and Kāẓim Ṣubḥī who were also of al-Zugurt faction, and al-Ḥāj Saʻad al-Ḥāj Raḍī
who was the chief sheik of the Shumurt. These sheiks controlled all four quarters, or
neighborhoods, of the walled holy city. Al-Ḥāj ‘Aṭīyah Abū Qallal was the head of the al’Amārah quarter, Sayyīd Mahdī Ibn Sayyīd Salmān was in charge of the quarter of al-Ḥuwīsh,
Kāẓim Ṣubḥī was the head of al-Burāq quarter, and al-Ḥāj Saʻad al-Ḥāj Raḍī was the head of alMishrāq quarter.5
The militant nature of these two tribal factions, their astounding defense of the holy city
against the raids of the Arabian desert Bedouins, and their successful revolt against the Ottomans
had undoubtedly put them on the radar of the already tribes-obsessed British intelligence.
Therefore, British official records pay considerable attention to the power and influence of alZuqurt and al-Shumurt in Najaf and their relationship with other population groups such as the
Persian and Arab traders on one hand, and with the other tribes in the vicinity of Najaf and the
Middle Euphrates Valley on the other. British official records harshly criticize the leading sheiks
of these two factions. Sayyīd Mahdī Ibn Sayyīd Salmān, the head of al-Ḥuwīsh quarter, was the
only sheik who avoided scrutiny in these records. He was also the only sheik who stood by the
British and provided them with shelter and support during the 1918 Najaf revolt, whereas the
5
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other heads of the remaining three quarters of Najaf sided with the rebels or openly joined their
cause. Interestingly, Sayyīd Mahdī Ibn Sayyīd Salmān was the archnemesis of al-Ḥāj ‘Aṭīyah
Abū Qallal, who was a powerful adversary of the British in Najaf and a leading figure in the
1918 revolt. Sayyīd Mahdī's decision to side with British authorities could be interpreted as
another manifestation of this intense rivalry with Abū Qallal. Although both men hailed from alZuqurt faction, they competed over controlling the entire holy city. According to Iraqi
sociologist Alī al-Wardi, Sayyīd Mahdī Ibn Sayyīd Salmān might already have a history of
siding with authorities to undermine his rival. It was rumored that Sayyīd Mahdī instigated the
Ottomans to accuse Abū Qallal with crimes against the state, leading to the latter's arrest and
brutal torture by the Ottoman authorities in 1914.6
Official British literature persistently points out that for more than two years and prior to
August 1917 when British forces took complete charge of the Middle Euphrates Valley, Najaf
was wholly controlled by the four sheiks from the al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt. Interestingly,
British officials were not impressed by these sheiks’ style of governance or their quick rise to
power, despite the fact that they received subsidies from the British government itself. These
four sheiks collected municipal taxation that they themselves pocketed. They had many bands of
armed ‘bullies’ in their employ; fellow townsmen who came from these four sheiks’ own
factions and neighborhoods, spearheading their rapid acquisition of a vast wealth and
unchallenged power. According to a British political report from occupied Mesopotamia, “how

6
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any respectable citizen survived with his life or with his money is a mystery. Each quarter was a
law unto itself; murders and street fighting were the order of the day.”7
Among the most noticeable aspects in the official British narrative of the situation in
Najaf is that it attempts to separate the sheiks of the al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt and their armed
militias from the rest of the population in the holy city. The educated and wealthy class that
hailed from both Arab and Persian families and the religious students and scholars including
Grand Ayatollah Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Ṭabātabā’ī al-Yazdī, who was the paramount head of alḤawzah al-'Ilmīyah of Najaf, “accepted the domination of the tribal sheikhs only because the
alternative was the still more distasteful domination of the Turks; the merchant class suffered
from their exactions and from the unchecked lawlessness of their followers.”8
With British direct rule and its resulting administrative reforms expanding in the Middle
Euphrates Valley, the unchallenged power of Najaf’s four tribal sheiks started to rapidly
diminish, alongside the subsidies that were provided to them by the British themselves to
guarantee their loyalty. Escalations between the British administration in al-Shāmīyah Division;
the British administrative region that included Najaf, were mounting, and disputes with tribes
from neighboring areas required direct British intervention. These escalations culminated with
the fateful attack on al-Ḥaffīz, where the seat of the British local government resided, during the
morning hours of 19 March 1918 that led to the death of the Najaf Political Officer; Captain W.
M. Marshall of the 37th Dogras and the British-Indian Political Department. Marshall’s
assassination, however, was not generally viewed as the culmination of tensions between
segments of the local population of Najaf and British authorities. E. A. Tandy’s Records of the
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Survey of India, for example, points out that "on the 21st of March 1918, the political officer at
Najaf, Captain W.M. Marshall, was murdered for no apparent reason."9
The lack of apparent reasons behind Marshall’s assassinations and the failure to connect
the events of 19 March 1918 to previous British-Najafi tensions had left its marks on how the
revolt was officially documented. Generally, official British government records, that mostly
belong to the India Office, characterize the revolt as a criminal act driven by unruly tribal groups
whose sheiks were vying for wealth and dominance. The British narrative also highlights the
potential role of a foreign influence, German in particular, that might have driven some of the
key players that led the revolt to rebel against British rule and to concoct a large-scale plan to
target all British political officers in that part of the Middle Euphrates Valley.10 British official
records also mention that a rebellion committee was created in Najaf to agitate the local tribes
against British forces, implicating more than a hundred members of the religious community in
the city, none of whom belonged to the upper echelon of the powerful al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah.11
The emphasis on the fact that high-ranking religious leaderships were not involved in the revolt
showcases another British attempt to place the blame on a single group within Najafi
community.
This official British characterization of the revolt stems from their already-established
understanding of the social and tribal dynamics that dominated Najaf in the aftermath of the
successful uprising against the Ottomans in 1915. Official British documents are adamant in
labeling al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt as the sole source behind the troubles in Najaf culprit, because

9
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the British understood the sacred status of the city and the level of influence its religious scholars
could exert over the majority of the tribes in southern Mesopotamia. These scholars were also
revered by millions of British subjects in India and millions of Iranian citizens whose country
was an important ally of Great Britain in the Near East. It was paramount for the British to
neutralize the religious leaders and keep the neighboring tribes in the Middle Euphrates Valley
out of the conflict by targeting and punishing a very specific and well-defined group. Alienating
these other groups in Najaf and the surrounding areas would have certainly created more military
challenges for British authorities and have helped the rebels garner more sympathy and even
material support from other tribes and the nearby urban communities. A full-scale military
conflict in Najaf would have also created a diplomatic crisis with Iran, in addition to internal
challenges in the British Raj, where Shia Islam is the official religion for several princely states’
royal families that ruled vast swathes of British India.
This characterization of the revolt is heavily pushed on the pages of al-’Arab daily
newspaper, which was published by British authorities in Baghdad to promote their policies and
interests among the local population. This official publication persistently reminded its readers
that the British administration and its military forces in Mesopotamia “took all necessary
precautions not to harm the holy city,” 12 not to mention respecting and protecting its esteemed
religious scholars. The newspaper also signaled to the local population that “the government
wants to punish only the true instigators of the riots,” 13 while concurrently publishing articles
that glorified the successful harvest season in al-Shāmīyah Division, highlighting the fortunes of
the surrounding tribal communities compared to the chaos in the nearby Najaf.

12
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For British authorities, characterizing the revolt as the manifestation of lawless tribal
townsmen’s reaction to the loss of their power and control in a new era of enlightenment, that
was ushered in by the British Empire, served the overarching objective of defeating the
Ottomans. It also reflected the collapse of a ruling system that would have no place in the new
post-Ottoman Mesopotamia. During the nineteenth century, Al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt competed
over controlling the holy city for decades and rebelled against their Ottoman overlords on
multiple occasions. These two factions were battle hardened by their constant confrontations
with the raiding tribes of the Arabian desert. Crushing the rebellion of al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt
and their power and reputation in the city once and for all signaled the end of an era whose roots
were deeply intertwined with those of the Ottoman legacy in Mesopotamia. When official British
reports discuss the aftermath of the revolt, among the most highlighted outcomes, beside
punishing the perpetrators who led the attack on the British Office on 19 March 1918, is the total
collapse of al-Zuqurt and al-Shumurt’s influence in the holy city. Neutralizing and weakening
tribal power in Mesopotamia are a recurring theme in the official narrative of the revolt and its
outcomes. These reports point out that “the town was effectively purged there is no doubt, and it
is improbable that under any circumstances whatever the Zuqurt and the Shumurt will again be
able to exercise their maleficent influence.”14
British official records do highlight the tribal-centric nature of this conflict. According to
the official Records of the Survey of India that documented the events of the First World War,
“after the suppression of the Najaf conspiracy, which had led to the murder of Captain Marshall
in March, there was no other trouble with the tribes, on either the Tigers or the Euphrates L. of

14
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C. during the summer of 1918."15 However, this short-lived stability and the successful
neutralization of the tribes in southern Mesopotamia came crashing down two years later when
the majority of the tribes in Iraq were in an all-out conflict with the British administration of
Mesopotamia.

15

E. A. Tandy, Records of the Survey of India Vol. XX, (Dehra Dun: Superintendent Government Printing,

1925), 34.

13

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORIOGRAPHY

There are several factors that have shaped the historiography of the 1918 Najaf Revolt
and the method used to document it in both Iraqi and British literature. The religious status of
Najaf, for instance, has played a significant role in shaping Iraqi historiography of the revolt. The
city’s tactical and religious importance in the British-Ottoman battle over Mesopotamia had also
been extensively documented by British official records and correspondence. During the hundred
years that followed this short-lived revolt, the religious importance of Najaf has not diminished,
and al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah has continued to play an instrumental role in influencing the political
reality of Iraq. The status and influence of this religious institution, combined with tribal
dynamics, have motivated several historians to revisit this short-lived event that looks minuscule
compared to many large-scale conflicts that wracked the modern Iraqi state during its first
hundred years of existence.
Additionally, the historical literature of both British and Iraqi sides could be seen as
present-minded with military and political realities on the ground in Iraq constantly reshaping the
characterization of the revolt. Early British narrative, preserved in British official records, is
clearly a product of the battlefield. The military situation on the Mesopotamian front and the
armed conflict with the Ottomans in Iraq dictated how British authorities characterize the revolt.
This battlefield-centric narrative seeped into the post-war British literature, which was mostly
personal accounts of the reaction towards Captain W. M. Marshall’s death. It took Western
literature decades and another large-scale military conflict with Iraq in 1991 to intensely delve
into the local nuances and motivations that drove the events in Najaf in 1918. The Iraq War of
2003 has also breathed new life into the notions of exploring and learning from the British
14

experience in Mesopotamia. This development on the ground in Iraq has yet again benefited
historical research exploring the revolt, especially the research focusing on the relationship
between British authorities and the religious and tribal leaders of southern Iraq, and the role local
tribes could play in any potential conflict with a foreign power.
This present mindedness, shaped by the military and political realities on the ground in
Iraq, has also hounded Iraqi literature concerning the revolt. The Arab nationalist government
saw the revolt as yet another historical vehicle to broadcast its Pan-Arabism and homogeneous
Iraqi identity. The collapse of this government in 2003 has provided Iraqi historians with a new
opportunity to revisit their modern history, and the Najaf revolt has been among the prominent
‘rediscovered’ historical events. This time, the focus has shifted towards the role of the religious
leaderships in shaping and leading the revolt in an attempt to reclaim ownership over a local
movement with large-scale national ramifications. The interest in this religious aspect has
generated new details and spotlighted new documents that expanded the overall historical picture
of the revolt. The shifting military and political realities on the ground in Iraq will continue to
ignite new interests and spotlight new themes, and both Western and Iraqi historians’
characterization of the revolt will continue to evolve and expand through the publication of new
Iraqi primary sources and their translations. This chapter examines how the shifting military and
political realities in Iraq have shaped both British and Iraqi literature, and how its historiography
tends to reflect contemporary political objectives.

British Post-War Narrative
Unlike official wartime records and documents, British literature concerning the 1918
Najaf Revolt, which was birthed following the conclusion of the First World War, is not chained
15

by the limitations of the military situation on the ground. An early revisiting of the events in
Mesopotamia by those who shaped and witnessed them represent a personal narrative of how
these colonial administrators evaluated the British policies in Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, the
events in Najaf in 1918 could have easily highlighted the potential challenges that could face
British authorities in Mesopotamia if a large-scale rebellion were to break out in the Middle
Euphrates Valley. Yet, most post-war literature treats the Najaf revolt as an isolated incident with
no true ramifications on the future of British rule in the country.
The fateful 19 March 1918 attack on al-Ḥaffīz, the seat of the British local government in
Najaf, signaled the starting point of the Najaf revolt against British forces. The most prominent
casualty of the attack was the highest-ranking British official in Najaf; Captain W. M. Marshall.
The young political officer, who had already lost his only brother in the Gallipoli Campaign, was
well-liked and respected by all his colleagues in Mesopotamia who survived the conflict and
went on to write about it. For these eyewitnesses, the cornerstone of the 1918 events in Najaf
was the death of Captain W. M. Marshall.
This focus on Marshall’s death is visible as early as the first week of the revolt. When
narrating the events in Najaf to her stepmother, Gertrude Bell, who acted as the Oriental
Secretary in British Mesopotamia, labels the events in Najaf as a tragedy, stating that “a terrible
cloud has fallen on our work here in the murder at Najaf of one of our young political officers - it
seems absurd to talk of one death as a cloud, but we have felt it deeply. He was a brilliant
creature; I personally was very fond of him.”16 In this private letter, written few days following
the start of the revolt, Bell points out the impact the death of Captain W. M. Marshal had on the
figureheads of the British administrative authorities in Baghdad.
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In his post-war memoir, Sir Arnold Wilson, who was the British civil Commissioner in
Baghdad from 1918 to 1920, echoes Bell’s sentiment regarding Captain W. M. Marshall. Wilson
does not shy away from calling Marshall “one of the best and wisest of men”17 whose
professionalism, fluency in Persian, and warm relations with the religious scholars in the Holy
City of Kādhimīyah had immediately endeared him to the figureheads of the prestigious alḤawzah al-'Ilmīyah of Najaf. Lieutenant Colonel John Tennant of the Royal Air Force also
reverberates this interpretation of the revolt in his 1920 memoir, condensing it into a mere
criminal act followed by the swift punishment of the perpetrators and that “after a period of
siege, those responsible were surrendered.”18
British journalist and writer Edmund Candler, whose account of the Mesopotamian
Campaign was also published right after the end of the war, also frames the revolt as the criminal
act of murdering Captain W. M. Marshall. Candler, who admired the young political officer and
viewed him as a genuine supporter of the Arabs, states that 21 March 1918 was the date of the
attack on al-Ḥaffīz.19 This date does not match the one provided by most British government
records and al-’Arab newspaper. Although E. A. Tandy's Records of the Survey of India, an
official publication by the British government of India, designates 21 March 1918 as the day
when Marshall's assassination took place,20 almost all other official documents specify that the
rebels’ attack on the British office in Najaf took place during the morning hours of 19 March
1918.21 It is possible this confusion was the product of early eyewitness narratives promoting the
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notion that the rebels desired to declare their revolution during the Shias’ New Year’s celebration
in southern Mesopotamia, observed on 21 March and coincides with Nowruz.
Nevertheless, the post-war British official publications present a more detailed narrative
that focuses on the big picture and the overall conflict with the Turks and their German allies.
Interestingly, the post-war official Review of The Civil Administration of Mesopotamia calls the
troubles in Najaf “the most delicate situation which had occurred since the occupation,”22 and a
large-scale German plan to ignite a rebellion among the tribes once British authorities take active
measures against the sanctity of the Holy City of Najaf. The plan was foiled because the German
officers who orchestrated it were captured in the town of ‘Anah with all their incriminating
papers and documents.
The British official history of the First World War, collected in 109 volumes, also departs
from the focus on the death of Captain W. M. Marshall, seen in personal memoirs and
eyewitness experiences, to shed more light on the German role in spearheading the ‘conspiracy’
during that fateful spring in Najaf. Brigadier General F. J. Moberly, who penned the official
history of the Mesopotamian Campaign, quotes Lieutenant General William Marshall’s war
despatch in its entirety to showcase that what fueled the fire of this Najaf conspiracy was
German gold paid by German agents and political officers who were operative on the
Mesopotamian front.23 This war despatch is dated 1 October 1918 when it became evident that
the Ottomans’ surrender was a matter of days away. Sir Arnold Wilson also highlighted the
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German role in instigating the Najaf revolt, citing documents that were in the possession of
German officers captured on the Euphrates during the same month; March 1918.24
Generally, post-war British official narrative characterizes the revolt as a criminal act
within a large-scale German plot to destabilize the Middle Euphrates Valley and push the British
and local tribes into a regional armed conflict over a potential British disrespect for the sacred
city of Najaf. This plot, documented in German papers seized by the British in other parts of the
Ottoman front, vindicates the choices that were made by the Civil Administration of
Mesopotamia and British military commanders to delicately address that critical situation in
Najaf without agitating the city’s paramount religious leaders and the tribal sheiks of its
countryside.
With the conclusion of the First World War, the British narrative of the revolt was no
longer constrained by the military reality on the ground. Shedding more light on the German role
in orchestrating these events became possible now that the Germans were defeated and the need
to keep enemy activities hidden was no longer necessary. Moreover, pointing the figure at the
Germans aligns with the overarching post-war narrative where "much of the intellectual history
of scholarship and commentary on the causes of the First World War has been focused on
Germany, and the debate over its responsibility and war guilt."25 The quick collapse of the
Ottoman forces in ‘Anah and Khān al-Baghdādī in March 1918 allowed the British to capture the
German liaison officers who accompanied these Ottoman forces. It is possible that this quick
defeat did not give the German officers enough time to destroy the papers and records that
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detailed their involvement in agitating the local tribes against British forces. These confiscated
papers served as a straightforward evidence incriminating the Germans.
Additionally, for British eyewitnesses who documented the revolt, their own experiences
and interactions with Captain W. M. Marshall, the young political officer who chose to postpone
his marriage plans and his trip home so he could serve in Najaf, had shaped their characterization
of these events. In published memoirs or personal letters of those who knew Captain W. M.
Marshall, the revolt is mostly described as a murder or a crime. The personal attachment these
individuals had with the deceased political officer explains why they characterized the revolt in
the way they did.

Returning to Mesopotamia: The Search for Lessons from the Past
By the late 1930s, the 1918 Najaf Revolt had received little to no attention, in comparison
to the 1920 Great Iraqi Revolt and its role in birthing the modern state of Iraq. In the few times
that the Najaf revolt surfaced in post-Second World War Western historical literature, it is
typically discussed within the larger context of the Iraqis’ struggle for independence, or as an
earlier sign of political and social unrest prior to the 1920 Great Iraqi Revolt.26 However, the
return of the British to Iraq during the 1990s and later in 2003, alongside their American allies
this time, and the resulting armed conflict, that has stormed the country for several years, have
generated an interest in exploring the lessons that the British learned while fighting their first war
in Mesopotamia. The Americans and the British were quick to realize that the tribal and the
religious dynamics, which dominated Iraq ninety years ago, still have solid roots in the social
fabric of the country. Therefore, revisiting British experience in Mesopotamia might provide
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valuable insight into how the US and the UK could confront the escalating challenges of the Iraq
War. This led to a historiographical expansion of the literature that explores the conflicts
between the British colonial authorities and the local population in all different parts of Iraq
during and in the aftermath of the First World War.
Although the role of Iraqi national aspirations in fueling the revolt started to surface in
academic writings dating back to the 1970s, it was not until the 1990s that this topic received a
thorough examination. In Eliezer Tauber’s The Arab Movements in World War I, Iraqi national
aspirations as a driving force behind the revolt are highlighted and directly linked to a national
movement spearheaded by Jam‘īyat al-Nahḍah al-Islāmīyah or the Society of Islamic Revival
which was created by prominent tribal and religious leaders of Najaf in early 1918.27 The Najaf
revolt also surfaces in Yitzhak Nakash’s The Shi'is of Iraq, and later in Reaching for Power: The
Shi’a in the Modern Arab World. His works provide one of the most detailed narratives of the
revolt in Western literature, and they heavily cite the writings of Iraqi historians and prominent
local figures who witnessed these events in Najaf. The works of both Eliezer Tauber and Yitzhak
Nakash indicate that both scholars are familiar with the Arabic language, and this has allowed
them to expand the historical narrative of the revolt by citing more Iraqi primary sources.
The Iraq War of 2003 and the subsequent long-term involvement of both American and
British troops in the conflict has intensified the academic interest in revisiting the British
experience during the Mesopotamian Campaign, especially concerning Western military
interactions with the country’s tribes and the religious leaders. When examining the 1918 events
in Najaf, Paul Knight’s The British Army in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918 focuses on the role of the
tribes in shaping the political reality in Iraq. Knight points out that German agents handsomely

27

Eliezer Tauber, The Arab Movements in World War I, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 32.

21

paid the tribal sheiks who were willing to fight the British on their behalf.28 On the other hand,
Peter Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country highlights the fact that British
authorities stopped their generous subsidies paid to the leading sheiks of Najaf who in return
turned hostile few weeks later.29 Knight and Sluglett’s observations showcase the importance of
the tribes in shifting political realities in Iraq. This theme is also highlighted in Abbas Kadhim’s
Reclaiming Iraq: The 1920 Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State. Although he
labels the Najaf revolt as a local, short-lived and limited affair, Kadhim states that “Iraqis have
learned a critical lesson: no successful uprising could be achieved without the involvement of the
tribes.”30
It is evident that the Americans have also learned the exact same lesson the hard way.
Following a prolonged period of tension and conflict, the US military established successful
liaison with the tribes of Western Iraq and financed al-Ṣaḥwah Movement, also known as the
Sons of Iraq, to confront radical organizations that migrated to the country in the aftermath of the
2003 invasion. However, the outcome of this American experiment mirrored that of the British in
1918 when they chose to stop the subsidies given to the sheiks. Once US subsidies disappeared
when the Americans left Iraq in 2011, al-Ṣaḥwah Movement groups lost their main financial
backer and became virtually nonexistent by 2013.31
Concerning the theme of lessons-learned, Ian Rutledge provides a very detailed narrative
of the revolt in his book Enemy on the Euphrates: The Battle for Iraq, 1914 - 1921, highlighting
the role of Jam‘īyat al-Nahḍah al-Islāmīyah or the Islamic Renaissance Movement in planning
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and executing the rebellion. Rutledge points out how treating the revolt as an isolated incident
that ended with what British authorities in Mesopotamia viewed as swift and muscular victory,
was in fact a temporary withdrawal by the tribes that chose to sit on the sidelines for a while,
waiting for the appropriate time to intervene. It was a missed opportunity for British authorities
to learn how to address tensions with local tribal leaderships before they escalate into an all-out
armed conflict.32
The tribal-British relations are a centerpiece in the recent Western historical literature
exploring the 1918 Najaf Revolt. The local perspective and Iraqi national aspirations are visible
in the overarching historical narrative, compared to the extremely British-centric viewpoint that
dominates the official British records and almost all post-war memoirs and histories. This new
characterization is based on a re-reading of British primary sources, combined with a serious
attempt to include Iraqi sources, mostly derived from memoirs and diaries of local figures who
witnessed the revolt and were in Najaf itself when British forces blockaded the holy city in April
1918. This ‘evolved’ characterization is a product of the contemporary political and military
challenges directly related to the situation in post-2003 Iraq.
Revisiting the complicated British experience in Mesopotamia, especially when an all-out
conflict between the Americans and the followers of the religious leader Muqtadā al-Sadr broke
out in Najaf in August 2004, presented an opportunity to avoid reinventing the wheel. Repeating
the obvious mistakes of that era could easily be avoided if a more comprehensive and inclusive
examination of British-Iraqi relations during and in the aftermath of the First World War was
conducted. Ironically, the majority of the Iraqi Shia community and its religious leaders have
also viewed their previous experience with the British as a lesson. Both Shia and Kurdish
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communities in Mesopotamia revolted against British rule. This contentious relationship with the
occupying force led to marginalizing and sidelining both communities for eight decades.
Understanding that they had a once in a lifetime opportunity to reverse the mistakes of the past,
“the Shi’a mujtahids, particularly Grand Ayatollah ‘Alī Sīstāniī, took no action that might
jeopardize a Shi’a rise to power for the first time in modern Iraqi history.”33 Thus, it is fair to say
that the 2003 war has remarkably reshaped the historiography of the 1918 Najaf revolt in both
Western and Iraqi historical literature.

Pre-2003 Iraqi Historiography: In Search for a Nationalist Narrative
According to Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “because none of the
governments of modern Iraq (including the monarchy) have permitted the kind of academic
freedom in which original and innovative scholarship could flourish, little serious work on
modern history has been carried out at universities within the country.”34 The Iraqi
historiography of the 1918 Najaf Revolt is no exception. Concerning this event in particular,
there is no significant historical literature that was produced during the early decades of the Iraqi
modern state. Although few magazine and newspaper articles about the revolt were locally
published and a number of scholarly works had mentioned it in the context of the 1920 Great
Revolt, no serious historical research to examine this event took place during this era. The
monarchy in Iraq had very strong ties with the United Kingdom, and this strong relationship
dwindled the chances of exploring anti-British movements in a country that erected statues for
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General Stanley Maude, Gertrude Bell, and other figureheads of the British administration in
Mesopotamia.
The 14 July 1958 coup in Iraq resulted in the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy,
which had been created by the British in 1921. With British influence rapidly disappearing in the
country, several historians started to revisit the era that witnessed the birth of the modern Iraqi
state. Additionally, prominent individuals who played key roles in shaping the events of that
crucial time became more vocal about sharing their firsthand experiences and recollections.
The decade that followed the collapse of the Hashemite monarchy witnessed the
publications of several memoirs detailing the personal experiences of prominent Iraqi figures
who were involved in the revolt. ‘Alī al-Sharqī’s al-Aḥlām (Dreams) and Jaʻfar al-Khalīlī’s
Ḥākathā ʻAraftuhum (How I Knew Them) are among the early biographical works that provided
personal narratives of the revolt. Even the renowned Iraqi statesman Muḥammad Riḍā alShabībī, who was an acquaintance of Gertrude Bell, published his own detailed account of the
revolt in 1969.35 Interestingly, during that same time-period, Arab nationalists led a coup that
brought the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party to power in Iraq. The new political ideology that would
go on to dominate the country for thirty-five years was relatively supportive of conducting
historical research that would reflect its ideological objectives. The 1920 Great Revolt, which
involved Kurdish, Shia and Sunni communities engaging in an all-out armed conflict against the
British, received considerable amount of academic attention during the early years of Ba’athist
Iraq, and this attention generated more interest in the lesser known 1918 Najaf Revolt.
Several renowned historians in Iraq revisited and wrote about the revolt during the 1970s.
‘Alī al-Wardī, Iraq’s most celebrated social scientist, explored the revolt in detail in his massive
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study of Iraqi modern history Lamaḥāt ijtimā‘īyah min tārīkh al-‘Irāq al-ḥadīth (Social Glimpses
from Iraq’s Modern History). Al-Wardī, who called the 1918 Najaf revolt the first ani-English
revolution in Iraq, presents a new approach to examining the key elements that drove the
uprising by pointing the finger at the Ottomans. He explains that Turkish authorities and the
military despised the people of Najaf, especially after their successful revolt against Ottoman
control in 1915. For the Ottomans, agitating the Najafis to fight the British would serve them on
two fronts: creating more challenges for their British adversaries in one of the most influential
towns of Mesopotamia and watching these adversaries destroy the people of Najaf who revolted
against Ottoman control.36 Al-Wardī also presents a positive portrayal of Captain W. M.
Marshall that mimics that of British sources.37 Interestingly, in almost all examined Iraqi sources,
W. M. Marshall is never portrayed as the villain. In fact, there are cases where he was presented
as an honorable man who grew up in Iran and spoke fluent Persian.38
The memories of Sayyīd Muḥammad Ḥassan al-Qūjanī, written in Persian, seems to be
the sole primary source that paints a negative image of Captain W. M. Marshall. Al-Qūjanī states
that Marshall was a devil pretending to be a human.39 His description of Marshall seems quite
personal, yet Sayyīd Muḥammad Ḥassan al-Qūjanī, who was a native speaker of Farsi Persian,
does not clarify whether he had encountered Captain W. M. Marshall or had the opportunity to
converse with him. Interestingly, even this sole negative characterization of Marshall showcases
the fact that he was indeed popular among the religious scholars of the city, and perhaps al-

36
‘Alī. al-Wardī, Lamaḥāt ijtimā‘īyah min tārīkh al-‘Irāq al-ḥadīth Vol. 5-2, (Beirut: Sharikat Dār alWarrāq lil-Nashr, 1974), 270.
37
Ibid, 264.
38
Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, Al-Najaf al-Ashraf wa-maqtal al-kābtin Mārshāl, al-ḥākim al-siyāsī al-Barīṭānī
1918, ḥaqā’iq wa-wathā’iq wa-mudhakkirāt min tārīkh al-‘Irāq al-siyāsī lam tunshar min qabl, (Beirut: Dār al-Qāri’
lil-Ṭibā‘ah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī‘, 2005), 425.
39
Al-Jubūrī, 384.

26

Qūjanī was not personally happy with the fact that his peers, the religious elite in the Holy City
of Kādhimīyah in particular, took a liking to the deceased British officer.
In Iraqi literature, the revolt’s villain designation tends to be associated with Captain W.
M. Marshall’s superior, the Political Officer of al-Shāmīyah Division Francis Cecil Campbell
Balfour, who was the nephew of the former British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Arthur
Balfour of the Balfour Declaration fame. Understanding the nature of the work British political
officers had to accomplish in Mesopotamia could explain why it was Balfour - not Marshall who was eventually designated as the paramount villain. These political officers acted as district
officials, intelligence collectors, judicial authorities, and military leaders, and they ultimately
could not wear all these different hats at the same time. "Most sought to fill the political vacuum
by developing personal contacts with community leaders in their district."40 Iraqi primary
sources highlight the confrontational nature of Balfour who did not shy away from scolding and
sometimes insulting community leaders and tribal sheiks in public before the observant eyes of
the entire community. Renowned Iraqi sociologist ‘Alī al-Wardī points out that there were
rumors indicating that Balfour even chose to slap or physically insult leading members of the
local community when disagreements surfaced between the two sides.41
In fact, several local eyewitness testimonies point out to Balfour's heated exchange with
al-Ḥāj Saʻad al-Ḥāj Raḍī, the chief sheik of the Shumurt and head of al-Mishrāq quarter. This
exchange that took place during the morning hours of 19 March 1918 right after the assassination
of Marshall was a major reason behind escalating the situation and causing an all-out conflict
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between the city and British authorities.42 Captain W. M. Marshall, on the other hand, did not
exhibit Belfour’s confrontational style and genuinely tried to build positive personal
relationships with community leaders and religious scholars. The completely different
communication styles of these two officers have shaped their characterization in Iraqi primary
sources, with Balfour gradually becoming the paramount adversary and the villain of the story.
It is ironic, however, that both British and Iraqi sources mostly agree upon the portrayal
of Captain W. M. Marshall, the man whose murder engulfed the holy city in total war. These
identical British and Iraqi characterizations of Marshall himself could be viewed as an indirect
admission that the revolt’s causes were not genuinely linked to Marshall himself or any action he
took while acting as the Governor of Najaf. Rather, his assassination was merely the spark that
ignited an inevitable conflict between the old system that ruled Najaf for decades and the new
one advocated by British authorities. To a degree, Marshall’s assassination resembles that of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, which triggered a series of events that ignited an
inevitable and long-awaited conflict.
Ḥasan al-Asadī’s Thawrat al-Najaf 'ala al-Inkīlīz (Najaf Revolution Against the English)
is perhaps among the most detailed narratives of the revolt that was produced during 1970s. AlAsadī interviewed some key players who shaped the events of that fateful spring, which allowed
their recollections to survive. ʻAbdu Al-Razzāq al-Ḥasanī’s Thawrat al-Najaf baʻda maqtal alKābtin Marshall (Najaf Revolution That Followed the Killing of Captain Marshall) and Ḥamīd
‘Isā Ḥbīban’s Ḥaqāʼiq Nāṣiʻa (Bright Facts) are also among the most comprehensive works
detailing the revolt that were written during the 1970s.
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The historical literature that was produced during the height of the Pan-Arab nationalism
era in Iraq paid considerable attention to the role of Jam‘īyat al-Nahḍah al-Islāmīyah (Society of
Islamic Renaissance) in spearheading the revolt. The fact that the chief Shia religious leaders of
al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah were not heavily involved in supporting the revolt was possibly what
made it easier to frame this short-lived conflict as an anti-colonial movement instead of a
religious one. Elevating the revolt beyond a mere local incident in a Shia town reflected the Arab
nationalists’ approach to reinterpreting Iraqi history and stripping it from its ethnic and religious
drivers in order to construct the illusion of a homogeneous nation. Kārīm Waḥīd Ṣāliḥ’s novel
Najm al-Baqāl: Qā’id Thawrat al-Najaf ḍiḍ al-Iḥtilāl al-Inkīlīzī 'ām 1918: Hāyātuh wa dawruh
fi al-aḥdāth (Najm al-Baqāl: Leader of the Najaf Revolution against English Occupation: His
Life and His Role During the Conflict), is a perfect reflection of how the Arab nationalist
authorities in Iraq desired to interpret and market the revolt among new generations of Iraqis.
Although the novel employs the events of the 1918 Najaf Revolt to tell the story of two lovers,
its glaring objective is to highlight Arab nationalism and a homogeneous Iraqi identity, and to
portray the British as vile and greedy rapists.

Post-2003 Iraqi Historiography: The Religious Factor
A thorough examination of Iraqi historiography concerning the 1918 Najaf Revolt would
point to Iraqi historian Kāmil al-Jūbūrī as the primary expert on this topic and the scholar who
unearthed and re-printed primary sources and wrote a number of books and articles documenting
multiple facets of this historical event. Kāmil al-Jūbūrī’s interest in the revolt is visible as early
as the late 1970s when Arab nationalist authorities were invested in exploring and exploiting the
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revolt. However, his post-2003 research, collecting and recording first-person narratives, is what
makes him among the most knowledgeable Iraqi historians who researched the topic.
Al-Jūbūrī’s extensive work in al-Najaf al-Ashraf wa-maqtal al-kābtin Mārshāl, al-ḥākim
al-sīyāsī al-Barīṭānī 1918 (Holy City of Najaf and the Killing of Captain Marshall, the British
Political Governor in 1918) and Wathā’iq al-thawrah al-‘Irāqīyah al-kubrá wa-muqaddimātuhā
wa-natā’ijuhā, 1914-1923 (Documents from the Great Iraqi Revolution, Its Causes and
Outcomes, 1914-1923) introduced new personal narratives of the revolt that challenged the
official account solidified by Arab nationalists during the 1970s. He did not shy away from
presenting the personal narratives of the Najafis who did not support the revolt and viewed the
rebels as criminals.43 Additionally, al-Jūbūrī’s biographies of two grand ayatollahs who
witnessed the 1918 Najaf Revolt: Al-Sayyid Muhammad Kāẓim al-Yazdī and Muḥammad Taqī
al-Shīrāzī, both published in 2006, highlight the role these religious leaders played in shaping
and driving the relationship between the British and the local population of Mesopotamia. Grand
Ayatollah al-Yazdī was the head of al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah during the Najaf revolt of 1918, while
Grand Ayatollah al-Shīrāzi was the occupant of this position during the initial stages of the 1920
Great Iraqi Revolt. Al-Jūbūrī’s biographical research of these two scholars showcases the power
and resources of al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah and its ability to impact the political and military reality
on the ground in Iraq.
This post-2003 historical literature has encouraged historians and scholars to depart from
the Arab nationalist interpretation and focus on the local motivations that drove the conflict.
'Abdullah al-Nifīsī’s Dawr al-Shi‘ah fī taṭawir al-‘Irāq al-siyāsī al-ḥadīth (The Role of the Shia
in the Political Progress of Iraq) reclaims the role of the Shia community in shaping the political
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reality of modern Iraq, and employs the Najaf revolt as an example of the impact Shia religious
leaders and tribes have had on influencing the political reality of the country.44 Al-Nifīsī also
interviewed eyewitnesses who experienced living in Najaf during that short-lived conflict.
Documenting these voices has protected their recollections and memories from being forever
lost. In Dawr ‘ulamā’ al-Shī‘ah fī muwājahat al-isti‘mār (The Role of Shia Scholars in
Combating Colonialism) Salīm al-Ḥasanī also employs the Najaf revolt to depart from the Arab
nationalist narrative and shed light on the role Shia religious leaderships played in leading the
Najaf revolt and other anti-colonial popular movements.45
New memoirs and biographies have also surfaced, enriching the revolt’s historical
literature. Zuhayr al-Jazā'irī’s al-Najaf al-thākirah wa al-madīnah (Najaf: The History and the
City), Muḥammad Amīn al-Khū’ī’s Mudhakkirāt shāhid ‘iyān ‘an thawrat al-Najaf 1336 H/1918
(Eyewitness Account of Najaf Revolution 1336 H/1918), Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʼs
ʻUqūd Ḥyātī (Decades of My Life) provided more intimate details of the revolt and shed light on
the experiences of the holy city’s local population during the British blockade. These experiences
reflect a diverse local reaction towards the events that stormed Najaf in March 1918, indicating
that the days where only a single homogeneous narrative of a historical event is allowed to exist
in Iraq are gone. Among the most prominent local voices that did not shy away from criticizing
the revolt was that of Muḥammad Māhdī al-Jawāhirī, one of the greatest Arab poets in the 20th
century, opening the door to debate new and different narratives that were previously deemed
unacceptable.46
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Iraqi magazines and academic journals, unlike their Western counterparts, have been
regularly publishing new articles about the topic since 2003. The majority of these new articles
tend to be a reiteration of the revolt’s basic historical outline with a focus on the role of the
religious leaderships in supporting the notions of sovereignty and independence. It appears that
this academic interest in revisiting the revolt has finally caught the attention of the Iraqi Federal
Government. The basic historical outline of the Najaf revolt finally found its way to the pages of
the national history textbook for twelfth graders in 2015, making its official debut in the
mainstream government-sponsored national narrative.47
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CHAPTER THREE: LOCAL PRIMARY SOURCES VS PAN-ARABIST NARRATIVE

Kārīm Waḥīd Ṣāliḥ’s novel Najm al-Baqāl: Qā’id Thawrat al-Najaf ḍiḍ al-Iḥtilāl alInkīlīzī 'ām 1918: Hāyātuh wa dawruh fi al-aḥdāth (Najm al-Baqāl: Leader of the Najaf
Revolution against English Occupation: His Life and His Role During the Conflict), published in
1980, encompasses the Iraqi Pan-Arab nationalists’ dream interpretation of the 1918 Najaf
Revolt. The version of history, presented in this novel, is impossible to construct using available
historical records. Therefore, a fictional piece of literature was created to encompass and
promote this version of history. Interestingly, the novel does not present itself as a fictional piece
of literature. The writing style, in fact, attempts to frame the novel as an accurate historical
narrative of the revolt and a biographical re-telling of Najm al-Baqāl and his son’s lives. The
novel also links British forces, Captain Francis Cecil Campbell Balfour in particular, to atrocious
war crimes that manifest the Middle Eastern anti-colonialism propaganda of the 1960s and
1970s. These alleged crimes are not recorded or mentioned by British or Iraqi primary sources,
and they cartoonishly resemble popular anti-colonial tropes in Arabic literature of the 20th
century. Balfour is portrayed as a lustful rapist who orders his soldiers to kidnap a beautiful Iraqi
girl from Najaf and to bring her to his private chambers, where he attempted to assault her. This
fictional history not only dramatically demonizes the British, but it also depicts the revolt as a
movement that unified the city, whose people were universally supportive of the revolutionaries
and their cause. Najm al-Baqāl, on the other hand, is depicted as the ultimate manifestation of
nationalist and Pan-Arab aspirations and sentiment, portraying him and his son as national heroes
who fought against colonialism and risked their lives for liberty and independence.
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Al-Baqāl, a former Ottoman soldier who turned against and fought the Ottomans during
the Najaf rebellion in 1915, was not a native of Najaf or one of its tribal sheiks or religious
scholars. Yet, Pan-Arab nationalist narrative elevated his status as the primary figurehead of the
1918 Najaf Revolt. The impact of this elevation has left its marks on the overall historical
narrative of the revolt. Ironically, this manufactured pan-Arabist narrative of al-Baqāl and his
role during this short-lived conflict in Najaf did not disappear with the collapse of the Pan-Arab
nationalist government in 2003. The current government of Iraq continues to view the
memorialization of Najm al-Baqāl as an integral element of the revolt’s official historical
narrative. When the 1918 Najaf Revolt made its debut on the pages of the national history
textbooks. the only photograph associated with the revolt in these textbooks is the statue of Najm
al-Baqāl from a local museum in Najaf.48 This museum, which is housed in a rehabilitated
Ottoman building that served as the jail where the revolt’s condemned revolutionaries were
imprisoned in 1918, is a government-ran institution, where once again al-Baqāl managed to
occupy the centerstage in how museum frames the story of the revolt. Furthermore, the current
Iraqi government had recently funded the production of a feature film narrating another fictional
version of Najm al-Baqāl’s story with themes of anti-colonialism and Iraqi nationalism.49 This
version of al-Baqāl’s story appeasrs to be a product of the so-called Mashrū' I'ādat Kitābat alTārīkh (Project for the Rewriting of History), spear headed by the Pan-Arab nationalist
government of Iraq during the 1970s and the 1980s. This government project attempted to
reconstruct Iraq’s history to serve the political and social objectives of the Ba'thist government.
Painting the 1918 Najaf Revolt as an anti-colonial nationalist movement, led by al-Baqāl, fits
perfectly with the party’s propaganda literature and interpretation of history. The scope and scale
48
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of the Project for the Rewriting of History, implemented throughout the years of Ba'thist rule,
"was unprecedented in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world."50 Therefore, it is logical that
remnants of the Pan-Arab nationalist literature and interpretation of history managed to remain
valid even after the complete collapse of the Ba'thist government of Iraq in 2003.
Nevertheless, memoirs of local figures who witnessed the revolt portray a complicated
image of Najm al-Baqāl that does not match that of the Pan-Arab nationalist narrative. Most Iraqi
eyewitness testimonies and historical research conducted by Iraqi historians indicate that alBaqāl was the head of the group that attacked the British Office in Najaf, and some eyewitness
accounts claim that he was the rebel who killed Captain Marshall. However, al-Baqāl is not
universally praised by Najafis who witnessed the revolt. This mixed response to his actions
reflects the divided political reality of the city during that fateful spring of 1918. In his memoirs,
al-Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kāshif al-Ghiṭa' blatantly calls members of al-Baqāl’s group
'ignorant', signaling out al-Hāj Najm al-Baqāl al-Duylaymī as the man behind the whole attack
on the British al-Ḥaffīz.51 Sayyīd Muḥammad 'Alī Ḥibat al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Shahristanī also
confirms that it was Najm al-Baqāl who led the attack against al-Ḥaffīz in Najaf and assassinated
the British governor, turning Najaf into a chaotic place with a horrified population that dreaded
the consequences of this action.52
Muḥammad Amīn al-Khū’ī recalls that Najm al-Baqāl had been planning to attack the
British for months, but he did not have any supporters at the time.53 Al-Khū'ī also highlights the
Ottoman connection concerning Najm al-Baqāl’s decision to fight the British. He points out that
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al-Baqāl “regretted his previous hostile actions and animosity against the Ottomans, and he felt
ashamed. Therefore, he did not want to go back to them empty-handed.” Najm al-Baqāl desired
to capture a prisoner or two so he could present them to the Ottomans as a gift in order to amend
their relationship.54 Other memoirs and journals of people who witnessed the revolt are also
adamant that Najm al-Baqāl was driven by the desire to amend his relationship with the
Ottomans. The memoirs of Sayyīd Muḥammad 'Alī Ḥibat al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Shahristanī states
that al-Baqāl traveled outside the city of Najaf a few months prior to March 1918 to meet with
tribal leaders who were fighting with the Ottomans in order to secure support for a potential antiBritish action in Najaf and its surroundings.55
Al-Hāj Najm al-Baqāl al-Duylaymī was a former Ottoman soldier who fought the
Russians and defended the Caliphate, but he turned against it when Najaf revolted against
Ottoman control in 1915. This conflict had allowed al- Baqāl to confiscate a salt shop that
belonged to the Ottoman authorities, turning it into a convenience store, where he sold
vegetables and dairy products. This store earned him the name ‘al-Baqāl’ which is the Arabic
word for ‘grocery shopkeeper’.56 Although the 1915 Najaf revolt against the Ottomans had
financially benefited Najm al-Baqāl, it appears that he had a change of heart. He believed that his
actions would force the British to attack Najaf, and this disrespect of the holy city would force
the tribes of the Middle Euphrates to fight the British. The resulting conflict would be his venue
to atone for his betrayal of the Turks in 1915. The situation on the battle in early 1918 made alBaqāl more anxious. The Ottoman military failures on the Mesopotamian front and their
approaching all-out defeat had agitated al-Baqāl who believed that attacking the British in Najaf
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and dragging them into a large-scale conflict with the tribes of the Middle Euphrates would
create an internal hostile front that would eventually strengthen the Turks. A rebellion in Najaf
would force British forces to retreat from the Upper Euphrates and focus on an internal conflict
instead of fighting the Ottomans up north.
In his memoirs, Sayyīd Muḥsin Abū Ṭabīkh states that he was summoned several times
by the British to be questioned about his relationship with a secret Najafi organization and its
plot to assassinate British officers in the Middle Euphrates Valley. Abū Ṭabīkh explains that one
of the reasons why he was a suspect is the recovery of Ottoman correspondence documents that
were in the possession of a German officer, highlighting the secret organization’s allegiance and
connection to Turkey.57 The testimony of Abū Ṭabīkh, who himself was among those who
fought the British during that period, puts a question mark on labeling the revolt and al-Baqāl’s
attack on al-Ḥaffīz as a national movement for independence. Eyewitnesses, who were in direct
contact with al-Baqāl, state that he intended to support the Ottomans. He did not seek
independence or self-rule for the native population of Najaf or the rest of Mesopotamia, and his
objective was to replace British rule with that of the Ottomans.
Interestingly, even Najm al-Baqāl himself knew that his actions garnered little support
from the population of Najaf and is surrounding tribes. When he opened his convenience store
right after the attack on al-Ḥaffīz on the morning of 19 March, he pretended that he did not know
anything about the attack that he had led few hours prior. Furthermore, he tried to publicly blame
one of the tribes of southern Kufa, and he accused them of killing the British governor, while
watching the city decent into chaos during that fateful morning. The reason why he chose to
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accuse this tribe in particular is because it rejected his request for support when he approached
them with plans to attack British authorities in Mesopotamia.58
Although Najm al-Baqāl’s true motives, his pro-Ottoman objectives, and his desire to
bring back the Turks to rule Mesopotamia are highlighted by several eyewitness testimonies and
Iraqi historians, they are seldom criticized or questioned, considering the fact that they contradict
with painting him as a champion of Iraqi liberation and independence. The continuous trend of
neglecting al-Baqāl’s true motivates showcases how Pan-Arab nationalist narrative had managed
to cement this unrealistic status of this figure even after the end of the Ba’athist rule in Iraq in
2003. Nevertheless, dissident voices highlighting al-Baqāl’s allegiance to the Ottomans have
recently emerged. Iraqi historian Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, who is considered a subject matter
expert on this topic, does hint to this contradiction in how al-Baqāl is portrayed in Iraqi historical
literature, but it is Iraqi historian Nabīl al-Karkhī who blatantly describes al-Baqāl’s true motives
and his commitment to fighting for the Ottoman Empire and its return to rule Mesopotamia. So
far, it appears that al-Karkhī is the sole Iraqi historian who has not shied away from confronting,
highlighting, and questioning al-Baqāl’s true motives, which could no longer be ignored
following the publications and re-discovery of various memoirs and eyewitness testimonies.
Tūmān ‘Adwah, one of the revolutionaries who fought with Najm al-Baqāl, was
interviewed by an Iraqi weekly magazine in 1968. ‘Adwah is among the few foot-soldiers who
managed to have his recollections of the 1918 Najaf Revolt recorded. However, this interview
remained irrelevant until Iraqi historian Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī unearthed and re-published it in
2005. The interview, which was first published prior to the Pan-Arab nationalists’ coup in Iraq in
17 July 1968, exhibits several discrepancies concerning how the revolt was later depicted by

58

Al-Jubūrī, 64.

38

Pan-Arab nationalists. The most glaring diversion is how Tūmān ‘Adwah describes the Najafis
reaction, which does not remotely resemble the Pan-Arab nationalist narrative of a unified people
coming together to defend their city and to collectively fight for liberty and independence.
‘Adwah states that the revolutionaries, headed by al-Baqāl, “wanted to ‘torment’ the population
with the revolt, and for this reason we selected one man from each tribe so all tribes will be held
responsible for the revolution.”59 This testimony of ‘Adwah indicates that the general public in
Najaf did not know about the revolt and was not eager to be involved in an armed conflict with
the British.
Tūmān ‘Adwah’s testimony showcases the complicated political reality of Najaf in 1918
and how al-Baqāl’s desire to ignite a regional war with the British was doomed from the start.
Several Iraqi primary sources provide a complex political and tribal map of the holy city that has
no connection to the simple and straightforward Pan-Arab nationalists’ narrative of the revolt.
For example, there are conflicting accounts concerning the Najafis’ desire to maintain the defacto independence that they won themselves by vanquishing Ottoman forces in 1915. British
records, on one hand, describe the chaotic and criminal nature of this self-rule system, developed
by the leading neighborhoods’ sheiks and their militias in the city.60 The desire to end this chaos
led many high-ranking religious leaders and prominent figures in the city to reject the rebels’
cause, side with the British, or at least choose neutrality. On the other hand, some local
testimonies, such as that of Sayyīd Muḥammad Mahdī Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, point out that the local
population indeed wanted to maintain this self-rule system.61 In his memoirs, Sayyīd Muḥammad
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Ḥassan al-Qūjanī also states that the local heads of this self-rule government tried to do a decent
job at managing the city’s affairs and providing the citizens with their basic needs. These local
eyewitness testimonies surely contradict with the British narrative, largely detailed in official
records, that the situation in Najaf was chaotic and it lacked the rule of law during its short-lived
self-rule period.62 The question over how the people of Najaf viewed their de-facto independence
remains one of the very few major topics where British and Iraqi sources immensely diverge.
Having said that, it appears that British authorities understood that a modified version of this
local self-rule system in Najaf would be the solution to prevent the influential city from causing
problems that could hinder the situation on the military Mesopotamian front.
The British appointed Hamīd Khān as a British governor of Najaf in August 1917, and it
appears that choosing him to govern the holy city was a form of compromise, because Khān was
both a local Najafi and a British subject. This compromise showcases a British attempt at
allowing the holy city to maintain some forms of its local self-rule system. Hamīd Khān himself
is another manifestation of the political division among the people of Najaf. The well-educated
and English-speaking Khān was encouraged to occupy this position by the paramount head of alḤawzah al-'Ilmīyah Grand Ayatollah Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Ṭabātabā’ī al-Yazdī. Yet, for some
of the revolutionaries, his willingness to represent British rule in Najaf was viewed as a form of
betrayal. Only recently have the negative views of Hamīd Khān’s actions and his service as
British governor in Najaf have been debated and challenged.63 Khān, was eventually replaced by
Captain W.M. Marshall when British authorities realized that this compromise did not put an end
to the escalations between the British and the tribal heads of the city.
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The complicated political map of Najaf is also showcased during the fateful day that
witnessed the attack on al-Ḥaffīz. There were two major incidents that took place on 19 March
1918 in Najaf: the assassination of Captain W.M. Marshall and the killing of two local proBritish policemen, who were members of a non-Najafi police force created by Marshall himself.
The motivations and the circumstances behind these two incidents are markedly different.
Concerning the first incident, Najm al-Baqāl and his group intended to support the Ottomans by
forcing the British to go to war with the tribes of the Middle Euphrates. As for the second
incident, there are several eyewitnesses who state that the shooting of the two local policemen
was an escalation of a fight and verbal spars. There was no unified plan that was embraced by
various key players and personalities in Najaf to revolt against British authorities. The latter
obviously also had no clear plans to immediately address any possible large-scale rebellions in
this vital region of Mesopotamia.
In his memoirs, Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shabībī states that Captain Francis Cecil Campbell
Balfour did not rush into attacking the city’s leaders and he wanted to conduct an investigation,
but the Najafi 'gang' chose escalation by killing two policemen and attacking and burning down
the old government office. These rapid developments led Balfour to escape the walled city and
allowed the revolutionaries to succeed in imposing complete control over the city. This control,
however, did not reflect a unified front inside Najaf now that British presence there had been
eliminated. There was a serious divide among the citizens, since those who led the initial
hostilities, including the attack on al-Ḥaffīz and the killing of the two policemen, came from alMishrāq quarter, which made these escalations appear to be generated by a single neighborhood
and not the entire city. Some locals in the other three neighborhoods did not hesitate to provide
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British soldiers and the local government police force with shelter.64 In fact, even the head of alMishrāq neighborhood al-Ḥāj Saʻad al-Ḥāj Raḍī, who accompanied Balfour when he came to
Najaf right after the attack on al-Ḥaffīz and the killing of Marshall, did not intend to drag the
entire neighborhood into this conflict. One of the sons of al-Ḥāj Saʻad al-Ḥāj Raḍī was behind
the killing of the two policemen, and when Balfour, who was touring the marketplaces of Najaf
with the rest of the city leaders, discovered the connection between Raḍī and the death of the two
policemen, he scolded him and accused him and his sons of also killing Marshall. However, Raḍī
and his family had no connection to and knew nothing about the attack on al-Ḥaffīz and the
assassination of Marshall.65 This public humiliation enraged al-Ḥāj Saʻad al-Ḥāj Raḍī’s sons who
tried to shoot Balfour himself upon learning about what he did to their father. Captain Balfour
was adamant that al-Ḥāj Saʻad al-Ḥāj Raḍī was behind the killing of Captain Marshall, and this
had pushed Raḍī to eventually join the revolt and act as its de facto leader. Balfour’s villainous
status in Iraqi primary sources makes sense in this context, because it was his verbal spars and
insults that most likely turned the killing of Captain Marshall into a full-scale rebellion in the
holy city of Najaf.
According to the eyewitness testimony of Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shabībī, Najm al-Baqāl,
alongside a large number of Najafi figures who participated in the revolt, were eventually
arrested by none other than the people of Najaf themselves. Al-Shabībī states that it was the
peaceful people of Najaf who desired to end the dire situation inside the besieged city by meeting
all the surrender terms imposed by British authorities. Upon his capture, the crowd, still suffering
from severe water and food shortage, attacked al-Baqāl verbally and physically66 Once again,
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Iraqi primary sources challenge the Pan-Arab nationalist narrative that elevated the status of alBaqāl and neglected the intricate and complex social and political spheres in Najaf during a
critical time-period that eventually shaped the future of the modern state of Iraq. Tūmān ‘Adwah,
whose recently re-discovered eyewitness account provides a rare description of the
revolutionaries’ state of mind while in captivity and prior to execution, narrates disturbing details
about al-Baqāl’s final days. ‘Adwah states that al-Ḥāj Najm tore up his garment with his own
teeth and he ended up completely naked because he did not want his enemies to take his clothes
and wear them once he was executed.67 The status of al-Baqāl as a tragic figure was further
cemented when his own son ‘Abbās, a former Ottoman non-commissioned officer who helped
connect his father with the Ottomans and encouraged him to attack al-Ḥaffīz, died the same day
that witnessed his father’s execution on 30 May 1918 succumbing to a sudden fever.68
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CHAPTER FOUR: LOCAL PRIMARY SOURCES VS RELIGIOUS NARRATIVE

The role the Najaf religious establishment played during the 1918 revolt has suddenly
become a subject of scholarly interest in post-2003 Iraq. The focus on this role showcases a shift
in how the national memory of the entire country has been re-framed to rid Iraqi history of its
Pan-Arab nationalist narrative. The religious scholars and students of al-Ḥawzah al-’Ilmīyah are
directly associated with Najaf, and these figures showcase the local nature of revolt, which has
been sidelined for decades. Interestingly, confronting the dominance of the Pan-Arab rhetoric in
Iraqi national memory has led to a renewed focus on the history of local communities in Iraq and
their role in shaping the identity of the modern Iraqi state that emerged following the collapse of
Ottoman control over Mesopotamia. The recent academic and popular interest in this short-lived
local conflict and the new focus on the role of the Najafi religious establishment highlight the
increasing attempts at countering the decades of neglect and even ridicule that marked the
treatment of Iraqi marginalized communities’ histories. Associating the revolt with the religious
leaderships of Najaf and labeling it as a religiously-motivated movement frame this anti-British
armed movement as a product of a local institution and rebuffs the notion that anti-colonial
struggle in Iraq is a mere segment of its larger conflict within the Arab sphere.
Yet the positions of the religious establishment in Najaf and its actions during the 1918
revolt are as complicated as the overall situation in Najaf during that fateful spring. Iraqi primary
sources pay considerable attention to the actions of Grand Ayatollah Muḥammad Kāẓim alṬabātabā’ī al-Yazdī, the head of al-Ḥawzah al-’Ilmīyah and the most powerful Shia religious
scholar in the world at the time who was resident in Najaf during the 1918 revolt. Once again,
these primary sources showcase a very complicated political and social reality that dominated the
44

holy city. Interestingly, Grand Ayatollah al-Yazdī was portrayed as ardently pro-British by a
number of prominent Iraqi historians and scholars who researched and wrote about the revolt
during the height of the Iraqi Pan-Arab nationalists’ rule in the 1970s. Ḥassan al-‘Alawī, who
was the most prominent Pan-Arab nationalist scholar in Iraq with ties to first-tier leaderships in
the Ba’ath Party, has promoted the notion that Grand Ayatollah al-Yazdī chose to side with the
British during the conflict. Similarly, the widely respected Iraqi sociologist ‘Alī al-Wardī also
states that “there are indications that the highest-ranking religious scholars, headed by al-Yazdī,
where deep down against the revolt.”69
Indeed, there are local eyewitness testimonies pointing out the disagreements between
Grand Ayatollah al-Yazdī and the leaders of the revolt who did not hesitate to show indifference
and even disrespect towards the most powerful religious figure in Najaf and the Shia world.70
However, the focus on al-Yazdī’s negative views about the revolt, which were heavily
highlighted during the Pan-Arab nationalist era in Iraq, could be interpreted as an attempt to
paint this local armed conflict as an exclusively national movement, by nullifying the religious
factor, the role of al-Ḥawzah al-’Ilmīyah in particular. Highlighting the narrative that the firsttier religious leaders chose neutrality or take the side of the British would also disconnect this
paramount religious institution from the struggle for independence in Mesopotamia.
However, this does not change the fact that a number of local eyewitnesses are adamant
that the views of the highest-ranking scholars of al-Ḥawzah al-’Ilmīyah, including its head Grand
Ayatollah Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Ṭabātabā’ī al-Yazdī, were not supportive of the Najaf revolt and
“some of them had possibly considered it a form of disorder and the work of a group of
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hoodlums.”71 In fact, during the early stages of the revolt on 25 March 1918, the religious leaders
of al-Ḥawzah al-’Ilmīyah signed a telegram that was sent to General William Raine Marshall,
Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Mesopotamia, asking him not to punish the entire
population of the holy city because of the actions of a group of hoodlums. Among the religious
leaders who signed this telegram was Grand Ayatollah al-Yazdī himself.72 Similarly, a British
telegram sent to the Persian Foreign Ministry in Tehran on 11 April 1918 states that al-Yazdī had
communicated with the highest ranking British official in Mesopotamia and informed him that
“the ulama and the poor had no part in the matter and urged that the water be turned on again,”73
in reference to the serious water shortage that was resulted from the British siege of Najaf.
In this case, Iraqi eyewitness testimonies align with official British records and
correspondence that highlight the lack of support the revolt received from the most prominent
leadership ranks of the Najaf’s religious establishment, who clearly chose not to be involved.
However, it is not possible to construct a detailed narrative of the complex the relationship
between the revolutionaries and the religious establishment in Najaf by only focusing on how the
first-tier religious scholars viewed and reacted to the revolt. Interestingly, the role of the religious
establishment is perhaps the most complex aspect of this short-lived armed conflict, where even
the views of those who chose neutrality or to side with the British could be open to multiple
interpretations.
A look into the mindset of Grand Ayatollah al-Ṭabātabā’ī al-Yazdī and his intimate views
about the 1918 Najaf Revolt are recorded by Sayyīd Muḥammad Ḥassan al-Qūjanī, who visited
the Grand Ayatollah during the height of the conflict when Najaf was besieged by British forces.
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In his memoirs, al-Qūjanī documented the interactions he had with the paramount head of alḤawzah al-'Ilmīyah, revealing nuanced aspects of al-Yazdī’s line of thought. According to alQūjanī, al-Yazdī was deeply hurt by the rumors that he befriended the British, because he viewed
his interactions with them as a venue that allowed him to combat discourse and
misunderstanding. Al-Yazdī told al-Qūjanī: “I did go to Kufa and I stayed there for a week or
two. Indeed, I was visited by some English officials. During these meetings, I managed to
eliminate many harmful disillusions they had in order to benefit the Muslim community.”74 It
appears that al-Yazdī understood that avoiding conflict with the British would eventually benefit
the Shia community and, according to his own words recorded by al-Qūjanī, he attempted to
confront misunderstandings and disagreements between the two sides to prevent unnecessary
escalations and bloodshed.
Al-Yazdī’s successors; Grand Ayatollah Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī and Grand Ayatollah
Fatḥullah Isfahānī’ rejected the British-led political process in Iraq in 1920 and authorized an allout revolution against British authorities. In post-2003 Iraq, their decisions have been debated as
being among the main reasons behind the second-class citizenship status of Shia Iraqis that lasted
more than eighty years.75 Al-Yazdī’s actions and the way he responded to the 1918 Najaf Revolt
indicate that the political and social map of British Mesopotamia might have looked completely
different if he managed to stay alive and maintain his position as the head of al-Ḥawzah al'Ilmīyah for few more years. This probably would have allowed the British to avoid the hasty
approach to creating the modern state of Iraq. This approach was a reaction to the all-out armed
revolt that stormed Mesopotamia in 1920, and it led to marginalizing the Shia and Kurdish
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communities for decades. Al-Yazdī’s willingness to interact with British authorities and avoid
unnecessary conflict might have easily prevented the escalations that led to the 1920 revolt.
Additionally, al-Yazdī’s handling of the British presence in Najaf in 1918 and Grand Ayatollah
‘Alī Sīstāniī’s handling of the American presence in Najaf in 2004 are strikingly similar. Both
religious leaders chose to reduce tensions between the two warring sides and broker a truce that
would spare the holy city and the Shia community at large from harsher political and social
complications similar to the ones that surfaced following the 1920 revolt against the British.
Al-Yazdī’s lack of support for the 1918 revolt in Najaf does not, however, exonerate the
religious establishment from having a direct involvement in this short-lived armed conflict with
the non-Muslim British. Painting the revolt as a religious movement also has its merits. Afterall,
Najm al-Baqāl and his group, whose actions were the primary reason behind the escalations in 19
March 1918, were fighting to restore the Muslim Ottomans as the rulers Mesopotamia. Most
importantly, a large number of the prominent local figures who founded Jam‘īyat al-Nahḍah alIslāmīyah (Society of Islamic Revival) were religious scholars and students of the religious
seminary of Najaf. This organization, established in Najaf, had al-Baqāl and his group as
members, and its literature and rhetoric appear to be a product of religious scholars and students
of al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah.
According to the prominent Iraqi historian ‘Abdul Razzāq al-Ḥasanī, Jam‘īyat al-Nahḍah
al-Islāmīyah (Society of Islamic Revival) was created prior to the fall of Baghdad in 1917, and
its objective was to liberate Iraq from the foreign infidel colonizers. Al-Ḥasanī also states that
among the members of this political organization were a number of religious scholars such as
Sayyīd Muḥammad Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Dimashqī, al-Mīrzā ‘Abbās al-
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Khalīlī, and Shaykh Muḥammad Jawād al-Jazā’irī.76 The latter was among the convicted
revolutionaries who were sentenced to be sent to India following in the summer of 1918. The
memoirs of the Iraqi politician Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shabībī also highlights the details of a
meeting that took place between Captain Balfour and Grand Ayatollah al-Ṭabātabā’ī al-Yazdī in
late April 1918, where Balfour handed al-Yazdī a list of religious scholars and students of alḤawzah al-'Ilmīyah who were suspected to be involved in supporting the revolt. al-Shabībī states
that the number of the wanted religious scholars on that list was between forty to sixty, while
other rumors claimed that the number was below twenty.77 Regardless, this list of wanted
religious scholars clearly indicate that this community had indeed played an active role in
igniting and leading the revolt.
‘Alī al-Wardī singles out al-Mīrzā ‘Abbās al-Khalīlī as the most prominent religious
scholar and most active member of Jam‘īyat al-Nahḍah al-Islāmīyah who was involved in the
1918 Najaf Revolt. However, al-Wardī highlights the fact that al-Mīrzā ‘Abbās al-Khalīlī was
not a first-tier religious scholar and was only twenty-two years old during the revolt.
Interestingly, the armed conflicts against the British in 1918 and against the Americans in 2004
were both led by young religious scholars who lacked support from the first-tier leaderships of
al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah and from other prominent religious figures of Najaf. Like al-Khalīlī,
Muqtadā al-Ṣadr, who led the revolt against the Americans in August 2004, was also a young
religious scholar whose supporters were mostly working-class people. In both conflicts, the
highest-ranking figure in al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah chose neutrality and also managed to prevent
further escalations by brokering a truce that eventually led to the conclusion of the hostilities in
the holy city. The mixed reaction among the population of Najaf and Southern Iraq to the more
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recent short-lived armed conflict with the Americans in August 2004 indicates that youth-led
uprisings, where less influential religious scholars are involved, tend to lack unanimous popular
support. Several eyewitness testimonies indicate that the 1918 Najaf Revolt had a similar fate
and it lacked universal support among the population of the holy city and the Middle Euphrates
region.
The intricate details concerning the role of the religious establishment during the 1918
Najaf Revolt makes it impossible to simply label this armed conflict as a religiously motivated
movement. However, highlighting the different social and hierarchical dynamics that governed
how various groups of religious scholars reacted to this revolt is essential to understand the
complex nature of the Najafi community during the end of the Ottoman era in Mesopotamia. For
the post-2003 historians of Iraq to reclaim ownership of their local history and rid it of the PanArab nationalist narrative, showcasing the role of the religious establishment is a legitimate
approach, considering the fact that this aspect of the revolt has been neglected for decades, and it
needs to be examined and revisited without the propensity to label the complex decisions that
were made by the various religious leaders as either patriotic or pro-occupiers. These decisions
need to be examined in the context of the political and social reality of Najaf and Southern
Mesopotamia during the final stages of the Ottomans’ collapse, where the country was going
through a rapid transformation that would eventually set the foundations for a new political and
social era that lasted for more than eight decades.
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CONCLUSION

Iraqi primary sources, including memoirs and journals of local eyewitnesses who
experienced or participated in the 1918 Najaf Revolt, reveal a complicated political and social
reality on the ground in Najaf during the final stages of the First World War. The revolt itself is a
direct outcome of this complex reality on the ground. For more than a century, this armed
conflict against British authorities in Mesopotamia has been framed as nationalist or religiously
motivated movement. Yet, these simple and straightforward labels bypass the complex political
and social landscape of the holy city and simplify all the intricate motivations, competing
loyalties and personal interests and objectives of the variant segments of the Najafi community.
The Pan-Arab nationalist narrative that adamantly labels Najm al-Baqāl as a national hero goes
against eyewitness testimonies stating that he desired to drag the city and the surrounding tribes
into an all-out war with the British in order to serve Ottoman interests. His loyalty to the
Ottomans, not the desire for a Mesopotamian independence, was his primary drive. This also has
been confirmed by British records and German documents that were recovered from the German
liaison officers who were captured with the Ottomans in western Iraq in late March 1918. Based
on the communications between al-Baqāl, and his son ‘Abbās, their decision to hasten the attack
on the British government office in Najaf was solely motivated by the desire to reduce military
pressure on the Ottomans who were fighting a fierce battle in the Upper Euphrates Valley in
March 1918.78 The Pan-Arab nationalist narrative that portrays the revolt as a popular movement
that garnered the support of the entire population, except for the first-tier scholars of the religious
establishment, has also been challenged by recently re-discovered eyewitness testimonies and
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memoirs of local Iraqis who witnessed or participated in the revolt. The city was not united
behind the revolutionaries, and many citizens, including members of the elites and tribal heads,
chose to publicly side with the British.
Regardless of its deep-rooted influence on Iraqi national memory, the Pan-Arab
nationalist narrative has been challenged following the collapse of the Ba’athist government in
2003. This sudden collapse has provided Iraqi historians with a new opportunity to revisit their
modern history, and the 1918 Najaf Revolt has been among the prominent ‘rediscovered’
historical events. This time, the focus has shifted towards the role of the religious leaderships in
shaping and leading the revolt in an attempt to reclaim ownership over a local movement with
large-scale national ramifications.
Pan-Arab nationalists’ attempt to paint the religious establishment as pro-British during
the revolt has been challenged following the collapse of the Ba’athist government in 2003, where
allocating a prominent and leading role to the local religious establishment appears to be an
attempt at refuting the version of history that elevated Pan-Arabist and nationalist themes that
downplays the local nature of the revolt. However, recently republished or newly discovered
Iraqi primary sources indicate that this alleged role of the religious establishment was far more
complicated, and it could not be viewed through a black and white lens. Iraqi primary sources
points to a generational disagreement among the religious scholars of Najaf. The most prominent
figures of al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah, including its chief scholar Grand Ayatollah Muḥammad Kāẓim
al-Ṭabātabā’ī al-Yazdī were not keen to support the revolt and desired to bring peace and
stability back to the holy city. On the other hand, a number of young religious scholars and
students of al-Ḥawzah al-'Ilmīyah chose to side with and participate in the revolt. The decision to
support the revolt meant that the prominent religious figures would have to accept the return of
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the Ottomans, while younger scholars viewed the Muslim Ottomans as the only available option
to combat the presence of the non-Muslim British forces in Mesopotamia. Grand Ayatollah alYazdī’s direct dialogue with British officials made him conclude that addressing misconceptions
and disagreements would lead to serve the Muslim community as a whole. For al-Yazdī, deescalation with the non-Muslim British was a practical path to avoid bloodshed and end
hostilities in the war-ravaged Mesopotamia. This pragmatic vision disappeared immediately after
his death when his successors; Grand Ayatollah Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī and Grand Ayatollah
Fatḥullah Isfahānī chose to declare war on the British during the 1920 revolt that engulfed the
entire country.
Al-Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kāshif al-Ghiṭa', who witnessed the revolt, states that
although many books have been written to document that time-period, not all its secrets and
details have been revealed yet, and that many facts are yet to be recorded.79 The ever-changing
political and social realities in Iraq will continue to expand the interest in the revolt and spotlight
new themes and previously unknown stories. These new revelations will once again reshape both
Western and Iraqi historians’ characterization of the revolt, which will continue to evolve and
expand whenever new Iraqi primary sources are unearthed.

79

Ibid, 362.

53

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abū Ṭabīkh, Jamīl. Muthakarāt al-Sayyīd Muḥsin Abū Ṭabīkh 1910-1960. Beirut: Arab Institute
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